' FOB THfcKT DIRECTOR FQfr REPORTS AND ESTllinTES CIA
APPENDICES TO
'The Strategic Value to the USSR of the Conquest oi Western Europe and the Near East (to Cairo) prior"
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APPENDICES TOABLE OF CONTENTS ECONOMICS APPENDIX
DISCUSSION
Raw Material Requirements and Natural
Food and Agricultural Resources and
Manpower
Machinery
Production of
Production or
Economic Organization and
SCIENTIFIC APPENDIX
II. DETAILED BREAKDOWN
Atomic
Biological
Chemical
Guided
Naval
POLITICAL APPENDIX
I.
of Political Considerationsoviet Decision to Over-
run Western Europe and the Near East before0
Soviet Analysis of the Political Considerations Outlined Above
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FOREWORD
The appendices here issued constitute three of the four subcommittee reports on whichas based. In general each subcommittee has analyzed andwithin its own sphere of interest and in terms of the assumptions stated for. the advantages and disadvantages for the USSR of the presumed operation. The economic, scientific, and military subcommittees have worked by adding the potential of the conquered areas to that of the USSR without taking intangible factors and war damage into account. This was considered toalid procedure since lt wasthat the intangibles would be given proper weight In the final synthesis of the subcommittees' findings. as this synthesis.
Thc report of the military subcommittee has not been included In these appendices because the material in that report has since been somewhat modified and has appeared in various papers prepared for high-level planning purposes.
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APPENDICES TO
"The Strategic Value to the USSR of the Conquest of Western Europe and the Near East (to Cairo) prior"
ECONOMICS APPENDIX
This appendix deals with the economic facts of the situation in the Soviet Union, in Eastern and Western Europe, and in the Near East, and the analysis of the economic advantages and disadvantages to the Soviet Union in the occupation of Western Europe and the Near East (to Cairo) by Soviet military forces. This appendix includes,only those aspects of the problem which have particular bearing upon the decision which the USSR might make with respect to such possible action and does not purport toomplete analysis of thc economic situation in these areas.
CONCLUSIONS
occupation of Western and Northern Europe and the Near East by Sovietyield to theumber of great long-range economic advantagesare recognized by the Soviet leaders. The principal gains wouldthe USSR, however, only if the Soviet Union and the entire area under itsrelatively free from damaging attack and if commercial intercourse werethe rest of the world. The roost important of these economic advantagesthe following.
control and utilization of technical skills (including engineering,managerial) and the extensive industrial facilities of Western and NorthernOccupation of that area would more than double thc technically skilledunder thc control of thc Soviet Union.
availability and facilities for the production of precision andmachine tools, precision gauges, large castings and forgings. and otherthc Soviet Union is relatively deficient in these essentials.
of an iron and steel Industry now producingigher rateof the USSR and which, therefore, would considerably strengthen thc
additions to the production of finished arms, ammunition, andpresent, however, the production of these items in Western and Northern Europesmall compared to that of the Soviet Union; thc principal Immediatebe thc acquisition by the USSR of manpower skilled in the techniques otproduction.
an extended period of peacetime control, occupation of Western andcould greatly accelerate the industrialization of the Soviet Union. Following
NOTE: These Sub-committee reports, on whichas based, represent agreed conclusions of the working-level representatives of the intelligence organisations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy. Air Force, and CIA. They have not been submitted to the Directors of these organizations for formal concurrence or dissent.
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a preliminary organizing period, the gains to the Soviet Union would mount and could eventually result In an economic unit of tremendous power.
It is not impossible thateriod of about ten years the Joint economic power (as Indicated in the following sections) of the USSR, the Satellites, and the occupied areas would equal that of the United Slates. Thereafter, the economic superiority ofonsolidation over the United States would become proportionately greater, with each successive year, in skilled as well as total manpower, in industrial capacity, and in the adequacy and self-sufficiency of the area with respect to natural resources.
If, however, insteadegotiated peace, there Is continuing global war between the USSR and the United Stales and ils allies, occupation of the European continent and the Near East would have Important economic disadvantages which undoubtedly arc also recognized by the Soviet leaders.
Thc principal disadvantages (or handicaps touile apart from destruction by military attack or sabotage, are the following:
to thc Soviet-controlled area of imports of certain strategic materials,natural rubber and tin and other non-ferrous metals. These things wouldavailable in quantities within the area adequate to maintain full-scale(and presumably would be denied to that area by virtue of sea and landalthough shortages of certain materials could be mitigated by the use ofsynthetics, and new industrial techniques. Oil. even if adequate inthe source in the Near and Middle East, would be In extremely short supply atpoints in Western and Northern Europe because of transportation difficulties.
difficulty and cost In manpower of establishing effective governmentalcontrol over the occupied area.
with Mediterranean and Atlantic coastal shipping under theof the USSR.
and Northern European deficits In agricultural products, such asand oils', and textile fibers would have lo be made up in part by shipmentsEurope where little "surplus" is available; in any cvpnt, diets in WesternEurope would have to be reduced below current low levels for largethe population.
extensive destruction of customary channels of trade, established sourcesand traditional industrial relationships would further reduce Soviet abilityeffective utilization of the resources, manpower, and industrial capacityWestern Europe.
economic disadvantages consequent lo occupation under conditions ofwould prevent the USSR from utilizing fully the potential economicoccupation. Transportation difficulties, deficiencies in certain strategicproblems of organization and management would reduce the output of steelmill products, machine tools and other machinery, electronics apparatus,instalments, and other items which the USSR would need from Westernaddition, the productivity of labor would be considerably reducedesult of
* Estimates of fats and oils are not included In the Appendix attached heicto.
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Increased sabotage and (he probable low morale of the populations In the occupied areas.he occupation of Continental Europe and the Near East, In fact, would not yield Immediate economic support to the Soviet Unionuch greater military effort than the Soviets alone could mount at the present time. This arises from the fact that the productive facilities of Western and Northern Europe,hole, have not entirely recovered from the destructive effects of the last war; they are not now engaged in, nor could they be readily converted to, production of naval ships, long-range aircraft, certain types of communications equipment and other types ot military supplies in which the Soviet Union Is deficient for global war. Conversion of facilities lo war production, furthermore, would also be hampered under conditions of global war by the damaging attacks to which plant installations would be subjected.
In the evenl, however,eriodear loonths elapsestrong counter-attack can be launched by the United Slates against thc USSR and the areas then under occupation, the Soviets would have lime lo reorganize Western European production sufficiently lo obtain considerable quantities of strategically Important Industrial products. The acquisition of the industrial plant, equipment, and technical skills of Western Europe would yield under such circumstances substantial wartime economic support lo the Soviet Union.
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DISCUSSION
I. Raw Matekiai. Requirements and Natvxaj. Resources. a Coal.
In the USSR Uie peak annual coal supply during World War II wasillion tons,ittle more than hah* the9 output. Although Soviet requirements have increased since that lime, primarilyesult of the expansion of Industries and transport, the USSR proper is expected lo be self-sufficient in coal. The remainder of Continental Europe is not ordmaiily self-sufficient in coal, as the United Kingdom has supplemented this area's supplies in previous years. In the event of Soviet conquest, however, those Industrial, transportation, and space-heatingessential to military occupation in Continental Europe probably could be met without recourse to coal supplies from olher areas.
b. Petroleum.
Soviet crude oil output9 will probably reachillion metric Ions. This Is only slightly in excess of prewar output, but considerably above thc Soviet peak annual supply during World War II (including lend-leasehich reached aboutillion tonst is Ukely. however, that the peak wartime supply could not have met rmnimum needs of the Soviet economy without substantial withdrawals from slocks, whereas thc probable depletion of stocks during lhe war and the tight petroleum situation in the postwar period suggest that present stocks are small. Despite augmented production, analysis of projected Soviet requirementsight over-all supply of crude oil. Under wartime conditions,evere shortage of light fractions required for lhe operation of the Soviet air force is also Indicated.
mall surplus of petroleum will be available from the Soviet orbitutput ot crude and synthetic oil In Eastern Europe (including Eastern Austria) will amount toillion tons, roughly two-thirds of which will be consumed ln that area. The Asiatic orbit, on the other hand, will be completely dependent on thc USSR for lis minimum needs, which are. to be sure, negligible.
Western Europe, although adequately supplied with refining facilities, willonlyillion tons of crude and synthetic oilresent consumption in this area Is at the rate of aboutillion tons per annum, but if maximum conversion to coal were effected and If Western European industry were utilised only to aboutercent of capacily. requirements might be cut backillion tons annually. This wouldeficitillion tons.
The availability of Near and Middle Eastern oil lo meet the European oil deficit Is extremely uncertain, even if thc Soviet Union should seize Intact the oil wells and pipelines In this region. In the absence ot destruction, this area (Including Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) will produce9 at Ihc annual rale of SO million tons, butfacilities, under the most favorable of circumstances, probably would not
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permit the shipment ol moteillion tons. It has been assumed, however,arge part of thc oil facilities and Installations in the Near and Middle East would be seriously damaged or destroyed prior lo evacuation by the present operators.on lhe extent and type of damage and destruction, therefore, thc availability of oil from this area to supply European needs would probably be less than the tow limits set by transportation difficulties, and, conceivably, could even be virtually nil.
This analysis indicates that the prospective over-all petroleum supply of the USSR and its Eastern European orbit would be barely adequate to meet the wartime requirements of these areas, provided non-cssenlial consumption would be reducedinimum. Bottlenecks would be likely to occur In the production of aviation fuel In Western Europe under Soviet occupation, it would be extremely difficult to supply minimum requirements. Even if as muchillion tons were available In, and could be transported from, the Near and Middle East, it would not be sufficient for full-scale utilization of the Western European industrial capacity, nor for any substantial Western European contributions lo mechanized warfare In lhe longer run, solution of petroleum stringencies would, of course, depend on Increased output In lhe Soviet-controlled area and solution of transportation difficulties.
ESTIMATED OUTPUT AND CONSUMPTION OF CRUDE AND SYNTHETIC OIL IN THE USSR. EUROPEAN ORBIT. AND WESTERN9 UNDER PROJECTSSUMPTIONS
millions of metric tons)
Orbit
Europe
Availabilities
Near East
Crude Steel.
The USSR is now producing crude steel at an estimated annual rate5 million metric tons, orillion tons more than its peak wartime supply.4 thc USSR consumed an estimatedillion tons of crude steel in theof principal military end-itemse.g. ammunition, tanks, guns, aircraft, and trucks. Other direct military consumption. for submarines, fortifications,s unknown, consumption of steel for maintenance of essential Industry, construction and equipment of war plants, and reconstruction of damaged installations Is also unknown. Not moreillion tons, however, were available for these purposes from domestic output, and the raw steel equivalent of machinery and equipment received under lend-lease was not moreillion tons. Hence, maximum wartime annualmay be taken at5 million tons. Essential steel requirements of Soviet industry now, however, may be expected to exceed those of World War XI.
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Western Europe (not including lhe United Kingdom) and the satellite countries in Easlcrn Europe are now producing crude steel at an annual rate ofillion metric tons, of which nearly-^'nThilon tons Is being produced in Western Europewesternhe combined rate of output of these areas amounts toon tons less than thc peak wartime output of the European Axis, and should be sufficient toar effort nearly comparable to that of the Axis in World War II.
Altogethei. the area assumed to be uiidcrSovie'. control now is producing crude steel at an annual rale of approximately 1STinillion metric tons, or abouttons more than the peak wartime supply of the Axis powers and the USSR combined. This steel capacity would, in Itself, be sufficient toar effort somewhat greater lhan the World War II effort of Germany and the USSR combined.
ESTIMATEF OUTPUT OF CRUDE STEEL IN THE USSR, EUROPEAN ORBIT, AND WESTERN EUROPE
(In millions of metric tons)
European
Western Europe (including western
d. Crude and Synthetic Rubber.
Although available data Indicate that there will be more rubber available in the USSR9 lhan the maximum amount consumed in the Second World War, it is likely that rubber wouldottleneck In ihe event the Soviets move into Western Europe and the Middle East The orbit and areas assumed to be brought under Soviet domination produce no natural or synthetic rubber. Synthetic production innow confined lo the Soviet Zone, is not expected to exceedercent of thc German wartime peak. Thc new rubber supply (synthetic and Soviet reclaimed and natural only) for the areahole will be approximately equal lo the maximum wartime supply of Germany and the USSR combined; but requirements of the area under Soviet occupation would probably be substantially higher than during World War II. In addition, the short supply of natural rubber in the area would tend to aggravate the over-all deficiency.
e Aluminum.
During the war. USSR production of aluminum, includingand secondary, amounted lo about two-thirds of Soviet consumption with the remainder supplied by Imports. This does not include aluminum imported In finished products, such as airplanes, which accounted for an important share of5 rate of production, however, is expected to exceed thc average annual rale of consumption during World War II.
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The satellite countries are not expected to meet their total requirements9 under peacetime conditions, falling short by several thousand tons.
Western Europe is expected to produceons of aluminumhich is less than half the annual rate of production of Axis Europe during World War II. Capacity of Western Europe has been reduced by dismantling of German plants, two of which have been shipped to thc USSR.
If thc USSR dominates Europe and thc Far Eastons of aluminum will be produced in that area, ofons could be consumed for direct wartimeufficient tonnage for full-scale military operations.
Although some Western European plants depend on the Western Hemisphere for bauxite, Europe and the USSR could readily become Independent of outside sources since Hungary has the world's largest bauxite deposits, and France, Yugoslavia, nnd Greece can supply substantial tonnages.
ESTIMATED OUTPUT AND REQUIREMENTS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ALUMINUM IN THE USSR, ORBIT COUNTRIES, AND WESTERN9 (In thousands of metric tons)
USSR
Orbit Countries
orbit
Europe
Total
Estimated
fabricating facilities limited.
opper.
During the war the USSR produced as much as IGO.OOO metric tons of primary copper annually, with secondary metal amounting0 tons. Since consumptionons annually, large amounts had to be Imported to meet war needs. Thc production of copper9 is expected toons (total secondary andhich will fall short of Soviet consumption in World War II,
The satellite countries are expected to produceonsr enough to meet their estimated peacetime requirements In that year. Western Europe's requirements9 will exceed Its production by moreons.9 the total output of areas assumed to be under Soviet control would beons, which would not be sufficient by far to supply the total requirements of the areahole. Assuming that the needs of the USSR were first supplied, however, the tonnage available to the remainder of the area would about equal the average annual copper supply of Axis Europe in World War n.
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ESTIMATED OUTPUT AND REQUIREMENTS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY COPPER IN THE USSR AND AREAS UNDER ITS9 (In thousands oj metric tons)
Satellite
Western
g. Lead.
Immediately prior to World Warhc production ol primary lead ln the USSR was0 metric tons; output reachedonsut has since then declined Deficiencies In thc Soviet lead supply during the war were
made up by Imports from thc United Kingdom and the United States through lend-lease.
The total output of lead in the USSRncluding secondary, has been estimatedetric tons, falling short of probable requirements in that year0 tons.
The production of lead from the satellite countries has been estimated0 metric tonsith requirements0 tons, indicating that the total output of lead In the USSR and the satellite countries combined would be able to satisfy requirements of the two areas. With regard to the rest of Europe, thc estimated requirements of lead for theetric tons, would far exceed estimated
productionons. Including all areas then, an estimated deficiency of
etric tons Is Indicated.
ESTIMATED OUTPUT AND REQUIREMENTS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LEAD IN THE USSR. THE EUROPEAN ORUIT, AND WESTERN9
(In thousands of metric tons)
European
Western
ft. Zinc.
The production of primary zinc In thc USSR for the90 metric tons;0 tons were producedrewar Information indicated that Independence from imports had about been achieved, but during the00 tons per year were imported, principally from the United States and the United Kingdom
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Thc total output of Hue. bolh primary and secondary, in the USSR for the9 has been estimatedetric tons and requlremenUons
* It is estimated that the production of zinc in the satellite countries9 will beetric tons and. under peacetime conditions requlremenU win0 tons, or an excess of output over requlremenU0 tons. The combined output of the USSR and satellite countries9 Is estimatedons and requlremenUons. Indicating an excess In output0 metric tons.
The estimated output of zinc9 for the rest of Europeetric tons andons,eficiency0 tons. Including all areas, the estimateseficiency0 metric tons.
THE ESTIMATED OUTPUT AND REQUIREMENTS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ZINC IN THE USSR. THE EUROPEAN ORBIT. AND WESTERNhousands of metric tons)
European
Western
i. Tin
Thc present annual production of tin In the USSR Is estimatedetric tons; output9 is estimated atons, which will fall far short ofThe deficiency in USSR9 would have to be met by imports through smuggling, or otherwise, from the Far East, for the total amount of tin available from the satellite countries as well as from the rest of Europe would be insufficient to fill all essential needs of lhe Soviet Union. Moreover, the lin requiremcnU of Western Europe alone9 would be greater than the combined production of all three areas.
2. Food Af nHksqukczs and RFQ.uwcMr.Nrs.
If thc area under domination of lhe Soviet Union should be extended in include Western and Northern Europe (excluding the United Kingdom) and lhe Middle East. Indigenous production of food within the entire area would not be sufficient to feed the working population at levels which would permit normal Industrial output and at the same time prevent widespread malnutrition among thc remaining population.
Before the war, the average net Import requirement of this area for bread grains and other grains combinedillion metric Ions During the consumption7 toet imporU into the areahole arc estimated atillion metric ions, because of low production In some areas. With improved crop conditions generally,mport requlremenU have been forecast3 million metric tons Assuming progressive economic recovery (including recovery InIn Western Europe, thc net import requirements estimated6 million tons and6 million metric tons.
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In prewar years lhe Sovtel Union, the satellite countries and lhe Soviet Zone of Oermany together produced an export surplus of grains, whichillion metric tons. Because of poor crops in the satellite countries the gram surplus of this area was reducedillion tons.ecause ofweather and Increased acreages, thc grain surplus may Increaseillion tons.he surplus production is expected to improve further toillion metric tons.
Both western Germany and Austria were, before the war. grain deficit areas If the Soviet Union, the satellite countries, and all of Germany and Austria are considerednit area, the prewar situation was one of surplus productionet export ofillion metric tons, on the other hand, tills areaet import requirementillion tons. Allhough crop prospects have improved ln some of thc Satellites and western Oermany.et import requirement for this area Is expected toillion tons,he Import requirement is expected to be reducedillion Ions andillion metric tons.
If the Soviet Union and all of Continental Europe are considerednit area, the prewar import requirementsillion metric tons.herequirement was increased2 million metric tons because of low production In the Satellites and Western Europe The Soviet production8 Is about the same asut the quality of the crop is pooler, ln the Satellites and particularly In Western Europe, however, the grainre better thnn those of the previous year, so that the net import requirement of Continental Europe and the Soviet) is expected lo be aroundillion metric tons.et grain import requirements are estimated8 million metric tons and..illion metric tona. The above estimates assume continued increase* in grain production which, with average weather conditions and improved farm techniques, are expected to take place on the European Continent. It the Soviet Union coined control
if iue otrisiGi union qam*
deficit of the area correspondingly.
Thc Middle East, Including Turkey, Syria. Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq. Iran, and Egypt, was an area of surplus grain production before the war with average net exportsillion metric tons.mports into the area are estimatedillion tons, buthe Middle East is expected to be againet export basis with estimated combined shipments5 million tons in that yearillion metric tons.
A summary of estimated grain production nnd trade, by thc various unit areas indicated above, Is shown in the table below Similar over-all deficiencies would exist for other foods and for textile fibers
ong-range point of view the Soviet Union proper would make significant gains in the fielU of agricultural technology if Western Europe were brought under Soviet domination, provided thc cooperation or thc technologists Involved could be obtained.
GRAIN: PRODUCTION AND NET TRADE OF SEPCIFLED AREAS. APPROXIMATIONS FOR8 THROUOH9 COMPAHKD WITH ESTIMATES. EXPECTANCIES1 AND WITH PREWAR AVERAGES.
Prod jc- Net' Uon Trada
Net Trade
D
Net Trade
of Metric Tons
Union. Satellites, and German Soviet Zone Bread Oralns Other Grains' Total Grains
8
J
*
S
2.8
2.1
2.3
4.4
23
2.3
4.5
Union. Satellites. Austria aad all Germany Bread Oralns Other Oralru' Total Oralnj
5
- oa
+3
5
+5
n 3
+ 13
Union and Continental Europe Bread Oralns Other Oralns" Tout Grains
3
3
5
9
+5
5
+
Union. Continental Europe, and Middle East Bread Oralns Other GrainsTotnl Grains
3
1 2M3
84
7
Annual averages of3 toxcept for Germany and Soviet Zone of Germany4 tond Middle East (calendarndicate) exporU;ndicate!ncludes rice, calculated lo rough basis wherever possible.ata compl'.ed as
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hort-time point ol view, however, the extension of Soviet control to Western Europe by military action would probably resulteduction of Indigenous farm products made available for non-farm consumption and,hutting off of imports from overseas, the shortage of food In urban areas would be even greater than hassince the end of World War II assuming comparable weather conditions.
3. Manpower.
The total Soviet labor force at the beginning8 is estimated to have been quantitatively somewhat weaker than It was at the beginning of World War II, butstronger than during the war. It is difficult to make even such generalabout the qualitative strength of the current labor force. During and since the war, considerable numbers of workers have acquired Important skills, thus making the labor force, on the average, more highly skilled thanevertheless, In part, because of thc magnitude of the present programs of reconstruction and Industrialthc Soviet economy al present Is believed to be hampered by shortages ot skilled workers.
Under Soviet control of the European continent, any labor shortages of the USSR, especially shortages of skilled workers, could probably be met by moving workers from the Soviet orbit, and certainly from the conquered area, particularly Western Europe. The highly Industrialized countries of Western Europe arc obviously potential sources of any types of industrial labor in which the USSR is deficient. Occupation of Western Europe alone would more than double the technically skilled manpowerengineering, mechanical, managerialavailable to the Soviet Union. Specifically, it wouldthe nonagricultural labor force under direct Soviet control from approximatelyillions toillions, compared to about SO millions in the United Slates (see tablehile Western Europe and Eastern Europe are capable of supplementing the Soviet labor force so as to insure peak war production, Soviet exploitation of their economies, on tht other hand, may encounter shortages of skilled manpower in certain key Industries such as coal, steel, and engineering, eveneduced level of output.
ESTIMATED LABOR FORCE OF THE USSR, WESTERN EUROPE, AND UNITED STATES,8 (In millions of laborers)
AC BI CULT URAL
FORCE
FORCE
Europe
Trizonla)
States
Macuinkhy Industries.
Since the USSR was able to conduct warfare on the scale of the Second World Warlant and equipment inventory greatly weakened by German destruction and
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occupation. II certainly could now produce sufficient military equipment loomparable level of military activity Current Soviet machine-building capacity exceeds0 levelubstantial margin. By the summerhe prewar production levels for almost all Items of equipment had been reached or exceeded by Soviet Industry; since then there hasteady rise In output In terms of machine capacity only, therefore, lhe Soviet Union la capable of exceeding its World War II performance. Despite this comparatively strong position, however, some machinery and equipment, such as precision instruments, automatic machine tools,precision machine tools, and equipment for the manufacture of high octaneare currently In relatively short supply in the USSR,
The absorption of the Near East by thc USSR would offer very few, if any, additions to the metal-working capacity of the Soviet economy. Moreover, under lhe assumptionarge part of the oil facilities and Installations in the Near East would be seriously damaged or destroyed prior to evacuation by the present operators, this area wouldrnin on thc Soviet machine-building industries, if lhe Near East oil fields were to be restored.
Control of Eastern and Western Europe, particularly the latter, would materially augment Soviet rapacity to construct machinery. In addition. European facilities for the production of various specific types of equipment such as those In short supply In the USSR at present, wouldurrent Soviet deficiency.esult of the added capacity, the machine-building potential of the Soviet-controlled area would approach the combined Soviet and Axis potential of World War II. Consideration has not been given, however, lo such factors as raw malerial supply, skilled labor, and transportation; these factors, throughout all areas, are likely to be more limiting than the plant capacity to produce.
5. Production or Munitions.
Seizure and exploitation of the armaments Industries of Eastern and Western Europe would aJd materially to Soviet military potentialities Of immediateto Soviet capabilities are the munitions industries of the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. Some of these industries have already been converted lo production of Soviet munitions, apparently with the objective of eventual standardization of ground force weapons wilhin the Soviet bloc. The complete integration of Czcchoslovakian. Polish. Hungarian, and Rumanian Industries with that of the USSR wouldery significant addition lo Soviet capacity; the other satellite countries, however,small and relatively undeveloped Industries, generally capable of producing only weapons parts and ammunition In limited quantities.
The principal immediate asset to be derived from Soviet acquisition of the countries of Western Europe would be the large reservoir of manpower skilled in the techniques of modem weapons production. The potential value of the munitions Industriesto the Sov'.ets are great, but their present lack of capacity resulting from wartime losses, and deficiencies In supply of basic raw materials would tend lo limit theirfor Soviet production plans until
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Production or Aircraft.
The USSR is estimated to have immediate production capabilities oret aircraft per year, of which allrc fighters,0 conventional aircraft,otal capability0 aircraft. By the last quarterhe USSR will have estimated production capabilities of0 jet aircraft per year, of which all butill be fighters,0 conventional aircraft,otal capability of0 aircraft annually. No foreseeable bottlenecks would prevent the attainment of thc above programs.
7 aircraft production in Europe, except for the United Kingdom and the USSR,ircraft of both civil and military types (excludinghe more important producers were France, Czechoslovakia, Sweden. Denmark,Italy, thc Netherlands, Turkey, Poland, and Belgium; output In the remaining European countries was negligible. Jet aircraft production was largely in the design and experimental stage.ew prototypes were constructed,8 it Isthat aircraft production willirframes with small series construction of Jet aircraft in France and Sweden. Stimulated by the political deterioration of thc situation in Europe, it is predicted that output levels mayircraft9rovided Soviet domination Is not previously extended over the entire area.
If the USSR gains control of Europe, it is estimated that the Soviets will have acquired aircraft productive facilitiesombined optimum output0 civil and military aircraft per year. Under conditions of occupation, however, actual output Is expected to be far from optimum. It is doubtful if the Soviets could push production0 aircraft per year priorbout two-fifths of0 figure would be produced by countries already behind the iron curtain. This estimatethe productive facilities of Germany. Austria, and other occupied countries which have already been largely integrated into the aircraft industry of the USSR.
In summary, within the USSR and those European countries now under Soviet control, taken together, it is possible that aircraft production could be stepped up to an annual rate0 within six weeks' time.0 this figure could be increased0 aircraft annually. If the Soviets should gain control of the entire European continent in thc immediate future,0 rate of production could be on thc order0 aircraft per year.
7. Economic Organization and Control.
In the event of Soviet occupation of Western Europe. It Is expected that theadministration of these countries will, insofar as possible, be in the hands of native Communist regimes rather than under direct Soviet military or civil control; effective ultimate control, of course, would be ln the hands of the USSR. Preference for this type of control stems, in part, from the shortage of skilled Soviet personnel for the direct administration of the countries overrun. In some of the Western European countries, however, particularly in those without strong Communist groups, economic administration would probably be under direct Soviet control, although native per-
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sonnel would still be widely used for intermediate positions. Despite arrangements to employ native organizational abilities, considerable numbers of Soviet personnel would be required for the administration of broad controls and for general supervision. The USSR would not be able to supply sufficient numbers of qualified personnel for these purposes.
Among others, the following developments would probably take placeesult of action by the USSR to establish Soviet control over the economies of thc countries:
with the Soviet regime would be eliminated from positionsin the economy. Including non-collaborators among the managementof at least thc more Important Industrial plants;
control of labor unions would be complete, and labor resistanceto thc fullest extent possible; nevertheless it is believed that certain elementspopulation such as those technically trained would be particularly reluctant
numbers of administrative and managerial personnel would bethe ranks of Communists, from those willing to join forces with Uie newthrough effective control over the persons and families of those involved.
The economic reorganization of the European continent under Soviet occupation would result In an immediate decline in over-all industrial production, as well as food deliveries to non-farm areas. largely because of changes in organization andand aversion of the technically trained populace to collaborate fully. If the USSR shouldegotiated peace shortly after occupation of the continent, it is believed that Soviet organizational and administrative capabilities would be sufficient to cope with these problems successfully,eriod of years to concentrate on their solution. If the USSR, on the other hand, shouldontinuing global war with the United States and Its allies, the problems of economic organization and control of the European continent will be of increased magnitude andore continuing nature. There probably would be Increased difficulty in dealing with resistance to collaboration,on the part of technically trained personnel. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union probably could not cope efficiently with thc organizational problems. The effect of this factor on Industrial output cannot be determined In concrete terms; it is believed, however, that it would be sizeable.
8. TKANSI'Oiri AT10N.
Under the conditions assumed, the USSR would acquire, particularly In Western Europe, highly organized rail transportation systems which are closely geared to the economic structures of the respective nations. Thc USSR would also Improve Itstransport at Ion capability by the acquisition of extensive railwayfacilities In which the USSR is notably deficient Thc quantities of goods which land transportations systems would be required to move In the conquered areas would be slightly less than they are now handling and therefore should present no serious problem
By seizing control of the rail systems of the European Continent and Near East, the USSR would gain internal lines ot communication extending to numerous ports on the
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Atlantic. Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf, connecting every major port and Industrial region of the conquered areas with the transportation net-work of the Soviet Union. The USSR would thusigh degree of flexibility for the organized distribution. In conformityomprehensive program, of the combined raw materials andproducts of the areas between Vladivostok and Gibraltar.
The extensive shipbuilding capacily of Western Europe (at least five times present Soviet capacity) would permit the USSR rapidly lo expand its merchant Beet. Greatly Increased movements of freight between Western European ports and the Black Sea would be possible at low cost, and Increased coastwise shipping would Indirectlythc capacity of the land transportation systems. Additional quantities of freight could be shipped from the Black Sea to the Maritime Provinces, which cannot now be satisfactorily supplied by the Trans-Siberian railroad and the limited amount of ocean shipping available. Likewise, oil could be moved from lhe Eastern Mediterranean and thc Persian Gulf Io export markets and to Soviet ports
A specific advantage which would result would be an ability to draw on thecapacities of warm-water ports throughout Europe to supplement the severely restricted capacities of ice-bound Soviet ports
However, under the conditions assumed, the effectiveness of all ports controlled by the USSH would be sharply reduced. Allied blockades would rapidly eliminate most of thc Soviet overseas trade and would severely restrict the volume of coastwise shipping. The USSR, therefore, would not be able to exploit fully the advantages of the extensive shipbuilding capacity in conquered areas.
Thc foregoing conditions would throw an additional burden on the landsystems. The strategic necessity of relying upon sources of supply east of the "Iron CUrUln"ubstantial part of the military supplies required in Western Europe and the Near East would further increase the demands placed on thc landsystems
Although Ih* rail systems of Europeeneral, on the mend and are capable of handling present peacetime traffic, and while it Is anticipated that the USSR would attempt lo expand capacities, the growing effectiveness of allied counter-action, plus local sabotage, would rapidly reduce the railway systems of Europeondition In which only the barest industrial and military requirements could be handled. Com plele collapse In certain areas could he averted only at excessive cost In labor and materials
A particularly weak spot in thel transportation system would persist In lhe war-damaged, dismantled, and deteriorated rail system in the Soviet Zone ofThis system, on the verge of collapse, is handling less than half of its norma! peacetime volume of traffic. There is al the most only one double-track line into Berlin Under wartime conditions the system might be organized on thc basis of one-way lines, which could probably handle minimum military requirements for through traffic The system would hardly permit thc full exploitation of the industrial potential of the area by the USSR
Another specific weakness would result from lhe poor linkage In land transportation facilities from the USSR to the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Oulf While
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rail system In this area would support Soviet occupation forcesoderate scale, It would not support thc requirements of an active defense of any sizeable scale, and would be particularly vulnerable to Allied counter-action and disruption caused by the actions of local populations.
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SCIENTIFIC APPENDIX CONCLUSIONS
strategic advantages In theoretical and applied science and lnengineering would be obtained by the USSH In overrunning Western EuropeMiddle East to Cairo for the first six months to two years of Sovietexploitation of the facilities and personnel of the pure and appliedIn highly industrialized Western Europe would, through assimilationscientific and industrial structure of the USSR, begin to have an ever greaterefieet upon Soviet war potential, and could Increase that potential by as muchpercent within five to seven years.
addition to over-all Improvement in strategic position, specific phasesSoviet military program would be affecteduch greater degree, largelyWestern European facilities in the scientific field supplement In many instancesdeficiencies In thc Soviet scientific and industrial structure. It Is believedoverrunning Western Europe8 thc probable date by which thc USSR willIts first atomic bomb would be advanced by one to two years aheadignificant stockpile of the bombs would be advanced. Researchof guided missiles, aircraft, and electronic equipment are otherof activity where the acquisition of Western European facilities Is believed toparticular importance to the USSR. Although the stimulating effect on thefrom the European Recovery Plan is expected to accelerate the postwarof Western European pure and applied science, an early move intoby the Soviets wouldcientific gain for them in advancing theirwar. However, It Is believed that the scientific gains would notufficienta move prior
the Middle East the USSR would acquire no important scientific facilities
or personnel.
the Soviets overrun Western EuropeB the earliest datemay have exploded their first atomic bomb would be advanced three to sixofhe probable date by which thc Soviets unll have exploded theirbomb would be advanced fromohould the9 to overrun Western Europe, the earliest date that they maytheir first atomic bomb would not be changed substantially; the probablewhich the Sovietshave exploded their first atomic bomb might be advancedAcquisition of the engineering and manufacturing facilities ofwould double the rate of progress of the Soviet atomic energy program.stockpile of uranium In France, which Is equalercent of thcstockpile, would be an immediate asset.
n view of thc acute lack In the Soviet Industrial structure of engineers,and special equipment required to translate scientific knowledge intothe opportunity to acquire these essential factors In certain key industries could be
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one of the most compelling motives for overrunning Western Europe. The moreIndustries are precision equipment, liquid fuels, the metallurgy of high speed and high temperature ferrous alloys and alloys of light metals, fine chemicals, and plastics. Many of the engineers and technicians who supervise design, development, and engineering possess high skill and creatlveness which are comparable lo the best technical ability in the US, and are consistent with the highly developed technique of these Industries. Thc acquisition of thc design and development facilities and thc trained personnel of these industries alone would accelerate the Soviet industrial plans and production in all strategic fields by anercent within three years and the gain would increase with time.
Though lhe electronics industry might properly have been grouped with those Industries discussed in the preceding paragraph, it is sufficiently important for special comment. The greatest problem facing thc USSR In the application of electronics to the armed forces lies in the translation of research results into actual productionthe Intermediate engineering phase of industry. Here, the prominent research institutes, the technical laboratories, and the capable engineers of the highly developed Western European electronics industry could make valuable contributions to Soviet progress in radar, guided missile control, and other applications of electronics lo modern warfare. The Importance of skills and facilities acquired In this field cannot be overestimated. Based on thc electronic tube production of Western Europe it is estimated that thc Soviet electronics capacity would be doubled or trebled by the acquisition of thc Western European facilities.
In aircraft and guided missile research and development the facilities of West-em Europe are substantial. Their acquisition may be expected to: increase the Soviet capacity to produce existing types of guided missiles0 percent for certain operational German varieties; advance the timetable for the development ofiles) subsonic missilesew months; and increase the capacity forresearch byercent. The date on which the USSR will have supersonicwould not be advanced.
Since no significant progress in research and development of naval weapons has been made in Western Europeirect and immediate gains to the Soviets would be slight. There are, however, groups of scientists and specific institutions in these countries which have made valuable contributions to the design and development of torpedoes and mines. If these were integrated into Soviet long-range plans for the development of naval weapons, they might readily have an important effect upon the ultimate product
It is estunatcd that the Soviets arc well prepared to wage chemical andwarfare. From the point of view of long-range plans, however, Western Europe would provide the USSR with substantial physical facilities and highly competentfor the expansion of her production of both chemical and biological warfare agents and research directed towards new and Improved agents.
Inventory of the scientific and experimental engineering personnelrelated equipment in the universities and Industries of Western Europe makes an
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Impressive picture when compared with the corresponding assets of the comparatively recently Industrialized USSR. In Western Europe there are about eighty universities and two hundred institutes of science, medicine, and technology, compared with thirty universities and five hundred scientific institutes In the USSR. If the USSR were to take over the Western European higher educational and organized research system in tola, the Soviets would Increase their reservoir of potential scientists, engineers, and physicians by aboutercent, and acquireercent as many students as arc now In corresponding USSR Institutes.mall fraction of the facilities and the associated personnel might be exploited effectively shortly after the initial occupation, gains to the Soviets from the great bulk of the scientific potential will require five to nine years.
fforts of the USSR to integrate quickly the Western European scientific and engineering personnel and facilities into the Soviet research program might lead to confusion and dissipation of effort that could temporarily impede Soviet scientific progress.
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DETAILED BREAKDOWN
1. ncY
By overrunning Western Europe the Soviets will be able to advance (a) the date by which they may have exploded their first atomic bomb, and (b) the probable date by which the Soviets will have exploded their first atomic bomb.
Should the Soviets overrun Western Europe8 thc earliest date that thc Soviets may have exploded their first atomic bomb would be advanced three to six months ahead ofhe probable dale by which the Soviets will have exploded their first atomic bomb would be advanced fromohould the Soviets wait until9 to overrun Western Europe, the earliest date that the Soviets may have exploded their first atomic bomb would not be changedtheprobable date by which the Soviets will have exploded their first atomic bomb might be advanced to
No important disadvantages to lhe Soviet atomic energy program are foreseen In the Soviet occupation of Western Europe and the Middle East.
Thc engineering and manufacturing faculties of Western Europe, if fully exploited by lhe Soviets, would double thc rate of progress of lhe Soviet atomic energy program; of particular Importance arc the designers and manufacturers of precision Instruments and equipment.
Soviet utilization of Western European skilled personnel would increase considerably the efficiency of Soviet Industry, and consequently accelerate the Soviet atomic bomb project
Western European scientists who are Communists, and those who may be complacent during Soviet occupation of Western Europe, can be expected to make beneficial contributions to Soviet research and hence lo long-range developmentswith thc atomic energy program.
Although considerable Western European research laboratory facilities and equipment were destroyed or damaged during the last war. several countries, such as Sweden and Switzerland, do have research facilities, which If acquired by the Soviets, would not only accelerate the current Soviet atomic energy program but would also contribute to future research and development.
Thc present stockpile of uranium In France (equalercent of present USSR stockpile) would be an Immediate asset to the Soviet atomic energy program Should adequate methods be developed for processing Ihc uranium-bearing
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shales of Sweden, these shales would increase the annual Soviet uranium supplyactor of five to ten.
Wahtake.
Some advantages In biological warfare would be obtained by the USSR,the risk of only minor disadvantages, In overrunning Western Europe and the Middle East.
The technical knowledge of France and western Germany, Including tbe results of years of research, together with the operating personnel of biological research Institutions, could shorten byew months the time necessary for the Soviets topecific goal in biological warfare capability.
Thc Soviets wouldroup of French biologists havingability, who with other Western European scientists and engineers are capable ot producing bacteria by the aerated culture method, at present the most promising large-scale bacteria production technique.
A limited amount of specialized operational equipment withcapacity to design and build additional equipment would be obtained.
The drain upon both Soviet and indigenous medical facilities In several of the countries of Western Europe, and particularly In the Middle East, might hamper seriously the defensive combating of biological warfare.
It is doubtful if the nations which had World War II biological warfare programs could contribute anything to that which It is believed thc Soviets already know on thc offensive aspects of biological warfare. However, by marshalling theand knowledge of Western Europe for intensive biological warfare research, the rate of Soviet accomplishment could be increased. Under the most favorablewhere one or more Western European scientists have or could devise thc answer to thc critical problems of dissemination, detection, and decontamination of biological warfare agents, the effectiveness of Soviet employment of biological warfare might be doubled or trebledhort time.
Despite the acceleration of the Soviet's own public health program and added emphasis on the training of physicians and assistants, the USSR could learn much from the countries of Western Europe. In the furtherance of defensive measures against biological warfare the doctors and public health administrators of Western Europe could be of great value to the Russians.
Summary.
Some advantages and no disadvantages would accrue to thc Soviets through their overrunning Western Europe and the Middle East
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ualified chemists and chemical engineers ln Western Europe would represent an estimatedercent Increase ln personnel under Soviet control capable of conducting chemical warfare research and development.
The chemical research and development facilities in France, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, and western Germany would increase by approximatelyercent the Soviet chemical research space adaptable to chemical warfare research
Soviet development of the German nerve gases that produce an extremely high percentage of mortality, could be greatly enhanced by the German researchand technicians who conducted the original work on the nerveJ"jr>b* '
A moderate number of facilities In France. Sweden, and Western Germany for study and production of the more common chemical warfare agents would increase the Soviet chemical warfare production capacity.
Two French chemical warfare experimental stations and one Belgian station wouldinor increase In the Soviet's present physical facilities.
Slocks of protective masks and clothing of improved design In Sweden. Belgium, and France would enhance the USSR position in defensive chemical warfare.
No disadvantages to the USSR chemical warfare program are foreseen.
Chemical research laboratories which the USSR would acquire in Western Europe, in comparison with her own laboratories, would be of considerable value. Similarly thc USSR would acquire capable chemical research personnel and, of greater Immediate Importance, the skilled technical force to operate an enlarged chemical warfare industry. In three to six months the laboratories and personnel could Increase the Soviet capability in these categories by approximatelyercent.
In chemical warfare the countries of Western Europe and the Middle East, with the exception of France, have concerned themselves only with the defensive aspects. In Belgium, Denmark. France, Sweden, and Switzerland thc respective armies are lo an appreciable degree equipped to withstand attack by chemical warfare agents. It is probable that some technical information of importance lo the USSR's defensive position might be obtained from the staffs of these armies.
France besides her defensive preparations, has conducted research on the nerve gases and has now progressedarge-scale laboratory production of one of these agents The two French chemical warfare stations, though under-equipped and under-manned, would be of value to the USSR. Protective masks developed by various countries of Western Europe which would be improvements over existingequipment would place USSR troopsetter defensive position in chemical
Thc numerous chemical research centers in western Germany, western Austria, Switzerland, Belgium. Sweden, Denmark, and Italy could figure in long-range development although their immediate value might not be great, as the USSR has
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undoubtedly used lo Ihc fullest extent the advanced slate of German knowledge ln chemical warfare. The USSR's present position with regard to chemical warfare Is so strong that the gains In Western Europe and the Middle East would be of greatest Importance In thc expansion of Soviet production of chemical warfare agents and in the long-term search for new and radical Improvements.
Summary.
The Soviets would have much to gain and nothing to lose In the field ofresearch, development, and production, by overrunning Western Europe. They will neither gain nor lose In the field of electronics by overrunning the Middle East.
b. Advantage!.
The prominent research Installations and outstanding research workers of Western Europe could make Immediate and valuable contributions to Soviet progress. Of great importance would be the capability of development engineers and skilled labor, together with their precision machine tools, to adapt new developments to the needs of the USSR.
Numerous specific types of developmental equipment which areover existing Soviet models would be obtained.
Based on the electronic tube production capacity of Western Europe, It Is estimated that thc Soviet electronics capacity would be doubled and possibly trebled by the acquisition of the facilities of Western Europe.
C. Disadvantages
No disadvantages lo the Soviet electronics program are foreseen.
d. Discussion.
Trie greatest problem facing the USSR in the application of electronics to the armed forces lies in thc translation of research results into actual production. The Soviet's greatest lack Is In Intermediate engineering, skilled labor, and precision machine lools.
In correcting the problem of actual applied electronics, development, and production, the Soviet gain would be greatest In France, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, and Sweden, in that order. In electronics research significant gains would be obtained in France. Holland. Italy, andesser extent in Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and western Oermany, In that order.
Summary
Some advantages and no disadvantages would be obtained in the field of guided missiles If the Soviets should overrun Western Europe. It is estimated that the Soviets would gain more in thc guided missile field by occupying Western Europe at the end of
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han at the endince Western European programs will be fartherby the end9 and more new concepts, resulting in refinements In Soviet missiles, would be acquired.
By thc end8 acquisition of Western Europe would augment the Soviet missile program by the additionignificant number of qualified personnel and guided missile facilities for basic research and development. This augmentation might decreaseew months the time for Soviet missile developments.
By thc end9 the USSR would acquire in Western Europe significant basic missile designs,mall number of completed test results, and some new considerations in propulsion and guidance. These acquisitions might contributeto Soviet refinements of their own missile program and might decrease the time required for thc development of the more complex missiles.
It is estimated that Western European production faculties forinstruments, and similar elements would Increase0 percent the Soviet capacity for production of existing types of guided missiles of the German operational varieties, plus some version of the WasserfaU and possibly the Schmetterting surface-to-air missUes.
No disadvantages to the Soviet guided missUe program are foreseen.
In the field ol guided missUes Soviet occupation of Western Europe would permit exploitation of relevant activity in France, Switzerland, and Sweden, the only Western European countries presently engaged in missile development.
By the end8 Soviet acquisition of thc French missile program wouldignificant number of experienced personnel and usable guided missile facilities qualified and organized for basic research. This situation in addition lo probable French innovations in fuel developments, might decreaseew months the time for Soviet development of long-range, subsonic missiles. By the end9 Soviet acquisition of the French missile program would be more advantageous in that the program would be augmented by certain phases of completed basic research and test facilities in long-range, ram or turbojet missiles. Acquisition of these assets might advance the Soviet timetable for development ofiles) missilesew months.
In Switzerland the primary advantage to the USSR by occupation would be the scientific knowledge and technical experience accompanying the development of the Oeriikon surface-to-air missile.8 work on this missile may be far enough advanced to assist the USSR in making refinements in similar Soviet missiles By the end9 small quantities of the missiles as well as limited productioncould be available to the Soviets, In this case, applied knowledge In missile guidance and fusing would probably contributemall degree to further refinements
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of existing Soviet missiles. Production experience may slightly accelerate the Soviet missile manufacturing program.
Sweden has evidenced some activity in guided missilethe activity has not been sufficiently extensive lo afford Importantthe USSR.
guided missile research exists In the Middle East.
6. ArscRAfT. a. Summary.
In aircraft research and development some advantages and no disadvantages would accrue to the USSR in occupying Western Europe. Considering the expected Improvements in the facilities, and the revitalizing of supporting industries, it isthat it would be more advantageous from the standpoint of gains accruing in aircraft research activities, for the USSR to occupy Western Europe at thc end9 than at the end
6. Advantages.
In Western Europe the USSR would increase Its capacity in aircraftby approximatelyercent. The gain would be in trained aircraft research personnel and ln the considerable research facilities, primarily wind tunnels.of this advantage would contribute mainly to Soviet subsonic aircraft research.
Supporting industries which are now receiving increasing governmental aid would come under Soviet control.
No disadvantages to Soviet aircraft development are foreseen.
It Is estimated that the acquisition of Western Europe In89 would njjt advance the date on which the USSR would have operational supersonic aircraft.
The Western European countries possessing substantial aircraft research facilities of value to the USSR arc Prance and Sweden; Italy and Switzerland wouldsome facilities of minor importance. The majority ol the trained personnel would come from the countries possessing the research equipment, but other countries have some trained personnel primarily concerned with theoretical aeronautics and aerodynamics.
France Is expected to spend approximately thirty million dollars72 for construction of new wind tunnels and modernization of existing wind tunnels. An important Installation, the German Oetzlal wind tunnel,eet in diameter with Mach Numbers now under reconstruction and may be substantially completedeveral small supersonic and subsonic wind tunnels arc inThe work being conducted in France is mainly on prototype aircraft, but there Is some basic research being conducted in "flow" phenomena. Comparing these wind
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tunnel facilities with known facilities In or controlled by the USSR, It is estimated that Soviet acquisition of the French aircraft research capacity would increase the former's capacity by approximatelyercent.
Sweden several wind tunnels are beiog utilized for research Ingas dynamics, and aerodynamics. The equipment is modem In all respectswind tunnels are small in size and limited in testing capacity. Swedishconducted in the high speed wind tunnels Is limited to component partscomplete aircraft. It is estimated that USSR acquisition of theseIncrease Soviet alrcrait research capacity byercent.
aircraft research exists in the Middle East.
Weapons.
In the field of naval weapons there arc some advantages and no disadvantages to the Soviets in overrunning Western Europe: no advantage or disadvantage willto the Soviets In the Middle East.
esearch plants and testing laboratories for the production of naval weapons in France, Italy, and Sweden wouldaluable acquisition to the USSR.
ompetent scientists and technicians who have made valuableto the design and development of torpedoes and mines in Italy and Sweden wouldeneficial addition to the Soviet capability to develop naval weapons.
No disadvantages to Soviet naval weapon development program arc foreseen.
No significant progress in research and development on naval weapons has been made in Western Europeowever, in France, Italy, and Sweden there are research plants and testing laboratories for the production of naval weapons that wouldaluable addition to similar types of Soviet installations.
In Italy andumber of highly competent scientists andhave completed valuable work on the design and development of torpedoes and mines and could increase the Soviet capability in this field though not necessarily adding any knowledge not already possessed by the Soviets.
naval weapon research exists in thc Middle East.
Summary.
The applied science and developmental engineering associated with the subject industries In Western Europe, together with the trained personnel and facilitiesfor their operation, would be one of thc most important advantages to be derived by thc Soviets in the occupation of Western Europe.
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The acquisition and assimilation of thc experimental engineering, design and development facilities, and trained personnel of the subject Industries in Western Europe could, by overcoming existing Soviet deficiencies, speed up the Industrialand output of the USSR in all fields by anercent.
There are none foreseen.
Nine countries in Western Europe and Scandinavia have significant and well established applied research, process engineering, and product development In one or more of these Industries. Of thc competent engineers and technicians who supervise this development, many possess high skill and crcativeness comparable to the best technical ability in this country and consistent with* the highly developed art of these Industries.
In the aggregate the combined Industrial potential of theseis large. How large may be best visualized by considering an indirect measure of industrial activity, such as. the relation of installed electrical capacity to theThese countriesotal electrical capacity of over twice that of the entire USSR and half that of the United States, whereas the combined population Is slightly more than that of this country and almost equal to that of the USSR.
(c) In total technical potential for the six Industries under discussion the countries are in the order of their Importance: France, western Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium. Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. Other European countries and those of the Middle East have practically no important industry, except thc production and refining of petroleum. Since the petroleum companies of thc Middle East arc foreign owned, the process development Is carried on In the country of the parent company and not in thc territory under discussion.
(d) Important as the applied research of these European countries is, considered merely as an integral part of their Industries, the significance to the Soviet Union Is much greater because in general the skills and equipment of the development stage ot an Industry are equally applicableide variety of problems within the industry, in fact, oftentimes lo those of related industries. Therefore the assimilation of the applied research, engineering and design facilities of Europe within the USSR industrial pattern should advance the over-all industrializationear's time substantially beyond that attributable alone to the acquisition of the productionof these countries.
Machinery.
(a) Even though precision equipment plays an important strategic role In the production of war material as well as normal civilian commodities, the Soviet's precision machine tool industry was Initiated Just prior to the war and1 produc-
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Hon was very small. The industry was heavily damaged in the war. and In apite of substantial receipts through lend-lease and the acquisition of large amount* of per-clsion equipment and tools from morelants in Germany, this type of machinery is still critically short In the USSR
In Europe there are five countries that have well establishedmachine tool industries. Switzerland leads thc world In quality ot finetools, gage blocks, precision machinery and precision measuring techniques andarge supply of highly trained artisans and technicians.heoretical engineering standpoint, the industry there Is ahead of that In this country, though behind in practical engineering. Sweden has one concern internationally famous in the field ot anli-frlction and ball bearings. In France and Italy the precisionindustry ts closely allied with the automotive industry In which the leading manufacturers have well Integrated technical staffs skilled in the design andof precision machinery.
The combined development potential in this industry in the European countries is estimated to be at least equal to that of the US. In general, the highly skilled technicians arc as creative and ingenious as the leaders In this country, but the supporting technicians arc of Inferior caliber.
Like the precision machinery industry the instrument industry in the USSR was Initiated immediately prior to the war. It was heavily concentrated at Kiev and Teningrad and consequently badly damaged in the war. Even though the fourth five-year plan calls for production of industrial Instruments, both optical and electric, seven times thatnstrumentation continues to be one of the critical Items in Soviet industrial plans.
In the scientific instrument field, thc Western European countries rank Is follows: Thc Netherlands, western Germany, Switzerland, and France The others nre of no consequence, although western Germany and Italy have Important optical industries In general, the quality of Instrument development in Europe Is inferior to that of this country and they have neither the talent nor the Incentive to produce gas diffusion instruments, such as were used in carload lots at Oak Hidge. Although the instrument industry of Germany was badly damaged during the war. remarkable progress has been made toward recovery in the British and US Zones, where the plants remaining were found to beercent intact Much of theand equipment In the instrument industry formerly located In Germany migrated during tho war to France, Italy. Sweden, and Switzerland. Hence, It is estimated that thc potential In the development and design ot all types of instruments Is as great In Western Europe today as prewar.
Fuels.
(a) The technical and operational level of the liquid fuels industry of the USSR is relatively undeveloped and far behind Ihat of this country. Although thermal cracking in the production of gasoline startedherc were still no catalytic cracking units in the USSR at the outbreak of the war.
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western Germany. France, and Sweden are sizable plantsespecially trained In pilot plant operations for the production of bothsynthetic liquid fuels. France has three plants for processing shale,of whomre experienced ln pilot plant and development work.of these plants isetric tons per year. In addition,concerned with applied research and development on liquid fuelsleast twenty-five top flight engineers supported by as many more creativehas five hydrogcnatlon and six Fisher-Tropsch plants employing somewith pilot plant experience. There Is in addition one plant forhaving at least forty employees with pilot plant experience. The combinedof these plantsetric tons. Swedeningle planttaff of fifty technically trained engineers, forty of whom have hadexperience. The installation consists of three or four projects all sponsoredGovernment. It Is well integrated in thc development and design phase.of this plant isetric tons per year.
thc production of synthetic fuels, these three countries havecapacityetric tons per year, orercent of thc fourthplan4 million metric tons annual production of liquid fuels
high temperature, high speed alloys andand their non-ferrous alloys.
In this field the development in Europe that would be of particular benefit to thc USSR Ls concentrated in the rather extensive hydroelectric metallurgicalIn France, Northern Italy, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland. These countries have large electric smelting operations for aluminum and other metals as wellide variety of other electric metallurgic processes. In general the equipment is good by American slandards and the metallurgists in charge of the technical developments of these Industries are highly trained, in fact more comprehensively trained thanpersonnel of this country. In Germany the industry for thc manufacture of high temperature alloys is better equipped with craftsmen and highly trainedthan thc corresponding American Industry, where the chief problem is to bridge the gap between scientific knowledge and the mclal Industry operators. This gap between theory and practice existsuch greater degree in the USSR. One concern In Germanyorld-wide reputation for the melting of high temperature materials, the development of large capacity melting furnaces and special techniques for the hot rolling of high alloy materials. The high frequency and vacuum melting units of that country arc so important that probably they should be concentrated in an area where they could be evacuated or destroyed in case of any move as postulated under this project.
Supplies and Fine Chemicals.
Iningle firm dominates the photographic field, producing films, plales. paper, and chemicals for exports lo all parts of thc world, except US, Japan, and Soviet-dominated countries. It is one of the world's largest producers of film.
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France and Germany have large and well established chemical industries producing all types of dyes, photographic materials, and fine chemicals. In conjunction with these large chemical Industries, there may be presumed loubstantial amount of applied research and experimental engineering in progress. In Switzerland several firms are leaders in thc manufacture of fine chemicals of high quality.
(7) Plastics (Including synthetic rubber).
Practically the only output In Western Europe of synthetic rubber Is from experimental projects. France and Switzerland have well established plasticindividual members ol which have cross-licensing agreements with corresponding American firms. Because of this arrangement, many of this country's most recent developments In the field of plastics and current technical information would become available to the USSR.
9. PXJtSOMXEL.
In Western Europe, with the exception of Spain and Portugal, the USSR would gain considerably in the acquisition of Industrial and educational laboratory facilities and their associated scientific and technological personnel In the Middle East thc gain would be negligible.
Given an estimated six months to two years for coordination, the Soviets would increase their active scientific and engineering manpower by approximately fifty percent, their potential reservoir of scientiststudents) byheir laboratory facilities for research by approximatelyercent.
Included in the above wouldmall but important number of scientists and engineers who. because of the international character of the companies where they are employed, have knowledge of US and UK research and developmental trends.
The attempt to integrate Western European scientific and engineeringinto Soviet research programs might lead to confusion and dissipation of effort that could temporarily impede Soviet progress
(1) Research Equipment and Laboratories.
(a) In Western Europe there arc about eighty universitiesnsti-lutes of science, medicine, and teclinology. as compared with thirty universitiescientific institutes in the USSR. Thus, by overrunning Western Europe, the USSR would acquire more than twice the number of universities which ii has at present, and almost half the number of specialized Institutes.
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Research Centers which would be ol Die most immediatethe USSR are the weapons laboratories ln Switzerland, Sweden, and Italy; thefacilities In France; the nuclear physics laboratories in France,and Scandinavia; and the electronics laboratories at Paris, France andThc Netherlands.
<c) The advantage accruing In laboratoryxpropriated precision measuring Instruments, cyclotrons, wind tunnels, and other equipment, would range from an Immediate gain ofercent in USSR domestic efficiencyteadily increasing gain of someercent for all the Soviet area.
Manpoioer.
(a) In Western Europe there aretudents in higher educational Institutions, while the USSR proper hasuch students. The present Soviet zone of influence probably increases the number of Soviet-dominated students by approximatelyercent. If the USSR were lo take over the Western European educational system in tola, thc Soviets would increase their reservoir of potential scientists, engineers, and physicians by aboutercent.
(b) Byroad estimate based on the fact that most of thcof Western Europe have, on anomparable number of scientists per head of population, it is believed that thc Soviet scientific manpower potential, both Industrial and academic, would be Increased aboutercent given full collaboration from these scientists. However, practical difficulties such as employing each in his most useful field, the possibility of non-collaborallon, and the inadequacy of certain facilities would suggest aboutercent as the final probable advantage.
is believed that the technological advance made by theWorld War II Is due in large measure to the use of those Europeans,Germans, not under control of the Soviets. By applying the lessons learned inzones of Germany and Austria, the USSR could begin to receive certainthe services of acquired scientific personnel in six monthsear.
Projects under Development.
Thc extent of the benefits to be derived would depend on thc status of the research projects in the acquired laboratories and on how closely such projects parallel Soviet paths of investigation.
The laboratories mentioneda) above, arc engaged in research projects which, because of the quality of the men, equipment, and type of Investigations, would become Russia's chief asset in scientific war potential.
Advantages to USSR.
A projected scientific advantage would result from Soviet control of Western Europe; that Is, by the Integration of thc scientific strength now scattered among the independent European nationals. In Sweden and Belgium, althoughsupport is considered adequate, thereack or competent nuclear physicists; in Denmark and Italy there are good scientists but they are hamperedack of
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funds; In Holland,ack of equipment. The Soviets probably would move the scientists In Denmark and Holland, for example, to the equipment in Sweden; and to appropriate funds for those research establishments most likely to produce best results whatever their "national" locatlon.
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POLTnCAL APPENDIX CONCLUSIONS
Political considerations do notoviet decision to overrun Western Europe and the Near East prior
This conclusion is based principally on the following considerations:
Occupation of Western Europe and the Near East would vastly increase Soviet security and administrative problems, and would create serious political instability throughout the Soviet orbit In the event of war.
Thc traditional Communist methods of subversion and infiltration, which ate less costly and involve less risk than military action, still offer substantial possibilities for continued achievement of Soviet objectives.
DISCUSSION
utline op Political Considerations In flue nooviet Decision to Overrun Western Europe and the Near East before
a. Within tJu USSR.
Advantages.
If it were possible to perpetuate the myth that the USSR was about to be attacked, the war might have the effect of unifying the Soviet people behind their government.
The arrival of consumers' goods from Western Europe would serve to placate to some extent dissatisfaction among the Soviet people with the war.
Easy initial victories of Soviet troops would enhance national pride and thus raise morale of the Soviet people.
Disadvantages.
The resultant global conflict would place the entire Soviet system at stakear to the finishime when the USSR is inferior to the West In potential military power.
Preparation for such an attack would serve to increase discontent among the Soviet people since Soviet industrial production would have to be increasingly diverted lo military rather than consumer's purposes.
The war would risk creating popular discontent within the USSR and would strain an already war-weary people.
The war would make the task of internal security control within the USSR more difficult since the demand for trained security forces elsewhere in Europe would be so great.
he war would risk mass desertions from thc Soviet Army and might pave the way for anti-Soviet guerrilla action by Ukrainians and other Soviet peoples.
overrunning of Western Europe and the Near East would make it far more difficult to Insulate the Soviet people against what the regime considers the pernicious influence of foreign "bourgeois" culture.
The war would risk Increase in Influence of the military and mightdevelopment of an organized and armed rival to the Party.
the Present Soviet
he present lack of effective opposition to the Communists would make occupation relatively easy.
he conquest of Western Europe would bring all of Europe under direct Soviet influence and thus eliminate the capacity of contiguous non-Communistto Influence thc satellite peoples against thc Soviet system.
Disadvantages.
The USSR would have to deal with opposition, which might emerge among elements, quiescent under Indigenous Communist occupation, that might rise In case of foreign occupation.
Replacement of present Soviet troops by green. Inexperienced forces might lead to excesses against local populations.
Soviet personnel both stationed in and in transit through present Soviet Satellites would see thc contrast between standard of living in the USSR and the Satellites.
Advantages.
(I) Occupation would extend the area under Soviet political control to cover all of Europe. The USSR would thus be able to eliminate all organized anti-Soviet oppositionational level and wouldree hand in the Communistof the population.
Disadvantages.
Lack of trained Soviet personnel to administer the occupied areas would make the tasks of control and exploitation difficult
There is probability that Western European morale will be lowered because of Soviet inability to replace American help in food and raw materials to an exhausted Western Europe.
Adverse effect of aggressive Soviet occupation on residue of sympathy for USSR among Western Europeans.
Present Soviet and local Communist ability to criticize and disruptassuming responsibilities would be exchanged for thc necessity to produce and deliver.
Soviet occupation, requisitions for army of occupation, and suppressive Soviet measures would bring underground resistance which would provoke further repressive measures. In contrast to the German occupation which found Western
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populations Inexperienced In underground or partisan warfare, Soviet occupation would find them familiar with both.
ubjection of Soviet troops and other personnel to Western democratic, Trotskyite, and anarchist propaganda. The last two groups are probably stronger in France at present than in any other country.
Occupation of Near East would give the USSR an advanced base for the political infiltration of North Africa, Pakistan, and India.
The elimination of Western political, economic, and cultural influence in thc Near East would eliminate polif icof "capitalist encirclement" of the USSR In that vulnerable area.
United
he Soviet leaders might expect that their initial successes would produce pacificism and defeatism among various groups in thc US.
Disadvantages.
The Soviet attack would probably unite thc American people and prevent Uie USSR from exploiting internal antagonisms in the US.
The war would lead to strict control of Communists throughout the Western Hemisphere, thereby reducing opportunity for sabotage.
of the
<i) The war might be the signal for insurrections in colonial Soviet seizure of Near East might intimidate Egypt, India, and Pakistan into following neutral policy.
oviet seizure of Western Europe and the Near East would serve to bolster Communist groups In the Far East.
Disadvantages,
oviet seizure of Western Europe and the Near East might have the effect of strengthening thc regimes of most non-European countries and uniting themohesive bloc directed against the USSR.
2. Probable Soviet Analysis or the Political CoNsntERATiONS Outlinhd Above. a. Within the USSR. Advantages,
hc Kremlin probably would have no illusionsar would unite thc Soviet people behind their government. Soviet experience with the Ukrainians and certain of the Crimean and Caucasian peoples during World War II should serve lo remind the Kremlin that its subjects arc far from united. Furthermore, it is doubt-
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ful that the Kremlin wouldajor decision on an estimate ot Its ability to control public opinion. Some observers question the Politburo's success in assaying public opinion and sentiment. The elaborate network of spies and Informers which has spread throughout all Soviet political, economic, and cultural life Is evidence that the Kremlin Is aware of this weakness.
Increased availability of consumerthe form of plunder from theundoubtedly dispel some ot the popular dissatisfaction with another war. It would, however, create another source of Irritation, evident during the latter days of World Wardissatisfaction of the average Soviet citizen with distribution of the spoils. Furthermore, most of the Soviet people remember the, and would not be anxious lo undergo again therolonged war.
Easy victories are, ofource of satisfaction lo any national ego. However, thc true testation and Its morale Is Its unity and determination in the face of adversity. The Kremlin Is inhabited by planners, who look at long-range objectives as well as short-range, and It is doubtful that they would act on the basis of short-term advantage alone.
Disadvantages.
Thc Soviet leaders, many of whom have spent thirty years ln building up thc power and prestige of their Socialist state, would be reluctant lo slake their life's work on such an uncertain gamble for world power. The present leadersolicy distinguished chiefly by caution, and unless Stalin dies soon and the power exercised by him and his associates falls into the hands of younger and more impulsive leaders, it seems Improbable that the USSR would presentlyajor war against the West.
Soviet production Is already geared primarily to military rather than consumer-goods production, and. while war preparations would further curtail the supply of consumer-goods and thus Increase Internal dissatisfaction, this condition might be temporarily alleviated by the arrival of loot from the West.
While, in the Initial stages, easy victories and loot would probablyany risk of popular discontent, the Kremlin would undoubtedly consider the long-range considerations more compelling, when the risk of popular discontent would be substantial. This, in conjunction with other factors (such as point four) woulda powerful deterrent to direct military action.
Soviet obsession with security, as such. Is well known to the western world and. at times, reaches extremes ridiculous lo western eyes. The security forces of the USSR constitute an elite guard, especially chosen and intensively trained, and are thus limited In numbers. Current indications, such as the intellectual purges, anti-espionage legislation,re that the Polilburo considers present securityinadequate or at least not wholly effective. It is likely, therefore, that the Kremlin would overestimate rather than underestimate thc security problemsew war would engender.
n the initial stages, the Soviet armed forces could, in all probability, cope with the problems of desertion and guerrilla activity, but the Kremlin probably realizes
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thai these factors wouldizeable problemrolonged war. especially If shrewdly exploited by thc psychological campaign of thc West.
Insulation of the Soviet people from foreign Influences continues toatter of primary Kremlin concern. As In World War n. wartime conditions would undoubtedly weaken Soviet Ideological defenses against Western Influence. Judging from current efforts to eliminate the "survivals ofhe dangers of exposing the Soviet people to foreign influences is probably substantially exaggerated byminds.
The Kremlin's Jealousy of the military was indicated In the personnel shifts which followed World War II. While party control of the Army ts probably sufficient, at least for the initial stage of "easyhe Kremlin might well be reluctant to have too much political responsibility devolve again upon the armed forces Emphasis on the military Inherentong war, would be especially undesirable if. during hostilities, the regime should undergo any fundamental transitions (such as might occur with the death of Stalin).
0. Within the Present Soviet Satellites. Advantages.
Kremlin leaders undoubtedly estimate that, under present conditions. Soviet forces would have little initial difficulty In occupying the whole of EasternWith all the satellite governments amenable to Moscow wishes. Sovietwould foresee no immediate effective opposition to direct Moscow control. In several of the East European countriesove would merely mean replacing and increasing present occupation forces, and thus would offer no serious politicalFrom the Moscow point of view, however, direct occupation of Eastern Europe is, In Itself, highly undesirable, no matter how easy of execution. For the ultlmnte gains to the Communist cause in thc satellite area are more readily attainedremlin policy of ostensible non-interference in the affairs of the "friendly" neighbors of the Soviet Union. Soviet policymakers further must realize that the Eastern European peoples haveatent store of hatred for Communism Consequently, an occupation that outwardly would look easy of execution could, in the long run. prove extremely cosily.
Soviet leaders have shown, by their many drastic attempts lo seal off the satellite countries from Western Europe, that they regard the flow of WesternIdeas into Eastern Europe as extremely harmful lo the Communist cause. The Kremlin no doubt realizes thatf the Eastern European countries haveigher standard of living than that thus far achieved under Communism With the growing disparity In living standards between Communist Eastern Europe and ERP-aided Western Europe, and the comparative freedom of the latter, thc Kremlin should foresee trouble arising from the impact of these factors on thc ideologically unasslm-ilaled peoples of Eastern Europe. The Politburo might consider the need for severing this Row of subversive ideas into Eastern Europetrong argument for military occupation ol the entire continent
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Disadvantages.
Soviet leaden realize from experience of recent years the bitterness aroused in East European peoples by their subjection to Communist puppetImposed with the backing of Soviet armed forces. The Soviet leaders also must estimate that Increased antl-Communist underground movements throughout the satellites are an ever present threat, ready to resort to guerrilla and subversive action whenever sufficiently encouraged by the hope of external support. Kremlin planning must assume that encouragement and support for these underground movements would. In the event of Soviet aggression, be forthcoming from the United States. The prospect of widespread and effective underground activity behind Soviet front lines would consequentlytrong effect In dissuading the Kremlin from direct military action.
The activities of Soviet troops during and after World War II, of which Kremlin leaders are fully cognizant,itter imprint on the peoples of Eastern Europe. Personnel of thc Soviet Armed Forces proved generally poor salesmen for Communism. In the event of Soviet occupation of the European continent, the more experienced and better disciplined troops would probably be deployed on the outer defense perimeter of Western Europe and thc Near East. Eastern Europe, occupied by less disciplined forces, might be subjectedecond round of plunder and rapine before the bitter experience of World War II had even been forgotten. The excesses of Soviet forces occupying Eastern Europe would thus be likely to provokeegree of local resistance as to present the Soviet commandrave security problem Mounting sabotage and guerrilla warfare would probably threaten lines of communication. Kremlin leaders, well aware of the manifold difficulties caused by lack of proper discipline among their troops in the past, would be reluctant lo face similar problems In lhe future.
In view of the high rate of disaffection and desertion prevalent among present Soviet occupation forces, the Kremlin would be seriously concerned as to the wisdom of exposure of large additional forces to the same Influences. Few qurslions appear to concern the Kremlin more than thc Ideological purity of lis subjects, and Soviet leaders have learned by bitter experience that the "remnants of capitalist flesh-pots" in Eastern Europe may corrupt even Its best disciplined troops
c. Western Europe.
Advantages.
<1> Occupation of Western Europe, which would give the Soviet Union control of all of the European continent, should appear to theery great political
advantage. Thc long-term objective of Soviet leaders Is lo hasten the downfall of capitalism in all parts of the world, and lo replace it wilh orthodox Communism To sovlcUxe the nations of Western Europe, with their world-wide prestige and influence, wouldremendous step toward thc realization of this long-range objective short term objective of tlic Kremlin is to ensure the security of the Soviet Union control of Western Europe would dispelreat extent thc fear of "capitalist en
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mont" Irom that area In the minds of thc Soviet leaders. US Influence on the Eurasian land muss would simultaneously be broughtontrollable minimum. Disadvantages.
The lack of trained Soviet personnel to administer the occupied areas of Western Europe would probably be viewed by the Kremlinormidable disadvantage. Soviet leaders, because of their inherent suspicion of Western Europeans, and because of their reliance within the USSRightly controlled bureaucracy, would probably desire toarger number of reliable Soviet personnel in the occupied areas than would be available. While this lack could be offset to some degree by the use of local Communists and fellow travellers, the Kremlin appears reluctant lo trust alienwith major responsibility.
The Kremlin in all likelihood would consider that Western European morale would be lowered because of Soviet inability to supply the area with necessary food, raw materials, and manufactured products. It is not believed, however, that the Soviet leaders would consider the lowering of Western European moraleajor political disadvantage. The Kremlin might actually consider lower Western European moraleolitical advantage on the assumptioneople without hope would prove much more amenable to Communist discipline and Ideology.
The Kremlin would probably realize that an aggressive Soviet occupation would have an adverse effect on the existing residue of sympathy for the USSR among Western Europeans The Soviet leadersolicy based on the dictatorshipomparatively small group, and therefore might tend to minimize thc effects of this loss of popular sympathy. Furthermore, they might calculate thatoss would occur only in the initial stages of occupation, and could subsequently be regained.respect of Western Europeans for civil rights, and experience in parliamentary government, would probably be of no great concern to the Kremlin.
The Soviet leaders would probably have some trepidation as to thc ability of leaders and members of Soviet and local Communist parties properly to carry out the administration of the occupied countries Judging from the difficulties in East-em Europe on this score, the Kremlin might be hesitant to lake onolossal commitment which would, In their minds, positively bringar with the US. with resultant sharp increase of difficulty of political administration of Western Europe
Any Kremlin estimate of underground resistanceoliticalwould depend largely on twothe number of occupation troops the USSR could maintain In the various countries of Western Europe,tsin Its ability to win the ensuing war with the US. The Soviet leaden would probably estimate that ruthless counteraction by Soviet occupation forces with the aid of local Communists, who are uniquely equipped for such activity by training and World War II experience, could prevent underground resistance from assuming serious proportions. The Kremlin would further realize that underground resistance lo Soviet occupation would increase in thc event of Soviet military reverses
(fl) The subjection of Soviet troops and other personnel lo the culture and standards of living of Western Europe would undoubtedlyery formidable po-
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litical disadvantage in Kremlin eyes. The constant attempt of the Soviet leaders to keep any Western Influence from permeating the USSR, the record of desertions Inand the stringent relndoctrlnation of returning occupation personnel show the Kremlin's fear of Western European Influence on the Soviet population. Theof all Western Europe would exposearge segment of Soviet personnel to some of tbe chief wcllsprings of Western culture and ideology- Such exposure might not only seriously infect the morale of the occupation troops themselves, but could spread back into the Soviet civilian population.
d. Hear East. Advantages.
Occupation of the Near East undoubtedly appeals to the Kremlin in that such action would further extend thc area of Soviet influence and provide anbase for thc political infiltration of areas adjacent lo the Near East. Thiswould, in thc minds of Soviet leaders, be at least partially negated by the fact that military action In itself would tend to strengthen anil-Communist elements in adjacent areas and would thus make political infiltration much more difficult. Military action In the Near East would mark the abandonment by the Soviet Union of tactics employed more or less successfully since lhe end of the war. There Is Utile evidence to substantiate the belief that Soviet methods of infiltration, subversion, and sabotage have reached the point of bankruptcy in tho Near East.
The Kremlin, in any contemplation of direct military action in the Near East, would consider thc importance of eliminating Western political, economic, and cultural influence In that area. The importance of this influence at the present time may well be overestimated by the ever-suspicious USSR. Should the Kremlin become deluded by its own propaganda concerning "capitalistic encirclement" and becomeof imminent aggressive action on the part of the United States, the elimination of US political, as well as military influence In the Near East mightecisive factor in determining Soviet policy.
Disadvantages.
he unification ot the Moslem world against the USSR would undoubtedly appear lo the Kremlineterrent to direct military action. The population within thc area occupied by the USSR wouldonsiderable potential for guerrilla action against thc Soviets. In view of the nomadic character of many of the peoples and thc problems of border control which would face the Soviet forces, movement of enemy reinforcement of personnel and material from the remainder of the Near and Middle East would be practically impossible to control Those Moslems outside thc area of Soviet occupation could be expected strongly to support any allied action against the Soviet position, particularly if furnished arms by thc US.
e. The United States. Advantages.
(1) The possibility of self-delusion within the Soviet hierarchy has been mentioned previously, and is likely toactor in connection with Soviet estimates
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of lhe Untied States. Dictatorships of the pasl have been prone to underestimate the moral and political fibre of democratic peoples, and the Kremlin Is probably no exception. Furthermore. Soviet leaders might hope that certain elements In the United Stales would attempt to Impede an all-out military effort Furthermore. Soviet propaganda, and perhaps Soviet Intelligence as well, have for so long been emphasizing the disparity between the sentiments of the American people and the policies of their government Ihat, in thc view of some observers, the Kremlin may have persuaded itself that thc US Government can no longer command adequately thc confidence and loyalty of the people.
If Soviet estimates of thc US have been distorted by the foregoingsome Soviet leaders mighthat the "laboring masses" of the US would have no stomachar against the USSR for control ofhat so long as US territory was not attacked, the US would be incapablenitedhai, once thc magnitude of the effort and sacrifice involved became apparent. US public opinion would be subject to growing doubl and uncertainty;hat finally, by shrewdly exploiting the foregoing, lhe USSR could argue that all it sought was an equitable division of thc globe between the two great powers, and Ihus could achieveegotiated peace, or atondition of armed truce, during which to consolidate its European positions and prepare for the decisive conflictater date.
Disadvantages.
the foregoing, however, thc Kremlin has shown In the pastcan face facts and learn from experience, even when contrary to Marxist teachings
The Politburo, al least, must have been Impressed with the US contributions in World Warwith thc proved US moral and material capabilities Furthermore, theIs todayirtually unprecedented example of US solidarity andin resisting Soviet expansion. The US Communists are rapidly losing mass-especially from the ranks of labor. Thus, Moscow can hardly fail to consider that Soviet aggression would be metnited and determined US resistance
Moscow probably counts heavily on the sabotage capabilitiesCommunist organIzalions, lhe US is moving rapidly Lo reduce thisthe experience of the Germans and Japanese with sabotage in theoffer the Kremlin small encouragement.
h. Rest of lhe World
Advantages.
While the global war resulting from Soviet aggression might encourage insurrections in colonial areas throughout lhe world, the USSR would beoor position to influence or direct such insurrections, and hence, could hardly expect to exploit them for Communist ends
While Soviet seizure of the Near East might intimidate Egypt, India, and Pakistan intoeutral policy, from the Kremlin point of view it might well have the opposite effectHoly War" were proclaimed. Moslems of all three countries would undoubtedly participate against lhe USSR. Furthermore, there is
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no guarantee from the Soviet point of view that these three countries might not join an anti-Soviet bloc
hile Soviet successes in Western Europe and the Near East would undoubtedly temporarily enhance Communist prestige and power In the Far East, the Soviet leaders would soon have to comeecision as to whether to exploit the northern part of the area. The Kremlin would probably estimate that thc rest of the Far East was too low on the Soviet timetable to be exploited by either the USSR or local Communists.
Disadvantages.
Thc Kremlin has alwaysreat fear of the possibility oforld united against it. In considering aggression, the fact that these moves may unite most nations of thc world in action against the USSR will be an Important factor In dissuading the Kremlin from taking aggressive action.
It appears unlikely that the Kremlin believes it can be assured ol friendly, or at least neutral, regimes, especially in the Far East, without expending considerable political effort which wouldartial and costly diversion offrom Europe and the Near East Without the assuranceecurity bell along Its Far Eastern borders, thc accompanying dangerulnerable "back door" will probably serveeterrent to Soviet aggressive action.
valuated in terms of long-range objectives, the relatively smallgains for the Soviet Union, both In Latin America and the Far Eastesult of aggressive action, would be less than could be expected to result from peaceful exploitation of discontent among the population of these areas and thc use of local Communist groups eventually to Install regimes sympathetic to thc USSR
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Original document.
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